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THEOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL MIND

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INTRODUCTION

Christianity as a religion is a movement rather than merely a body of doctrines. Each successive age has undertaken to rethink its Christian inheritance in terms of its own thinking and social experience. That such a rethinking has not always been complete or, indeed, effective, is due to the fact that authority, both ecclesiastical and political, has injected an element of immutability into inherited beliefs. But none the less, the development has gone on as each successive age has felt the tension between its religious inheritance and its own new conditions, and has attempted to readjust and accommodate the one to the other.

Strictly speaking, Christian doctrines are what Christians believe about religion. This fact seems so elemental that it is strange it has been so overlooked. In fact, without cynicism, one is compelled to say that among those least able to understand the development of Christian theology have been the theologians themselves. The reason for this is easy to see. Theologians are liable to the besetting weakness of abstract conceptions. Instead of looking at Christianity as a concrete movement carrying along with itself and to a large degree conditioned by the social experiences of Christians, they are prone to abstract Christian thought from Christian history and to be more interested in definitions than in activities. Too many students of our religion are unable to see a generic unity expressing itself in variant Christian groups. Abstract doctrines and rites are conceived of as essential rather than

as functional and in consequence men cannot see Christianity because of Christians. Yet Christianity itself as a definite historical movement, a religion in the fullest sense of the word, has always refused to be identified with definitions and philosophical statements. It needs and has its doctrines, just as a state needs and has its constitution and laws; but as a phase of the life process it formulates doctrines for its own protection and self-direction.

For doctrines form a real element in Christianity. Sometimes it is said that the relation of theology to religion is that of botany to plants.¹ The analogy is only partially true. The plant does not produce botany; Christianity does produce doctrines. Without them, Christianity might become an unadjusted sentiment lacking intellectual support. While Christianity is more than doctrines, its development can be traced in large measure in those concepts by means of which Christian thinkers of successive epochs have endeavored to classify their religious experiences and hopes with the other things they know. But this doctrine-making process, while a phase of the development of Christianity, is not the origin of Christianity. The life of an organism is more than its limbs, and the vital element of Christianity as one phase of religion is more than the doctrines to which it gives rise. In order to understand religion we must study religious people; which is only another way of saying that it must be studied synthetically rather than analytically. Just as we cannot study life if we separate the organism from its environment, so we cannot separate religion from the totality of experience. The persons who are religious are exactly the same persons who live, marry, trade, fight, amuse themselves, and organize states. In a word, a religion in none of its elements can be understood apart from the actual, concrete experiences of the people by whom it is practiced. The only real history of doctrine is the history of people who hold doctrines.

I think it will be clear that this view of Christianity involves, not only psychology and sociology, but also the possibility of distinguishing with some degree of accuracy the various doctrines and practices of our religion from the genius and vital impulse of Christianity itself. Such a distinction is particularly desirable in a day like ours when thoughtful men find themselves on the one

¹ As for example in Clarke, *Outline of Christian Theology*, I.

side perplexed at the division of Christians into groups each claiming superiority over all rivals; and, on the other hand, find religion itself challenged to prove its right to survive. Unless we are able to discover in Christianity something more than its various ecclesiastical divisions, we shall be very likely to feel that the challenge is unmet. If, on the other hand, we can discover something real and final back of the variant practices and theologies of Christians, we shall not only be likely to have a larger confidence in Christianity as the movement which has given rise to varieties of Christian communities, but we shall also have a larger respect for many doctrines which otherwise seem untenable. For we shall judge them to be functional rather than essential elements of the Christian religion.

The process of making such distinctions is as yet by no means complete, but falls into the general class of historical-social valuations. Once we admit that Christianity is a religion subject to the laws of social and individual development, we have a clue to what sometimes seems an ecclesiastical labyrinth running up into a theological blind alley.

The fact that doctrines are essentially a part of our religion is only another way of saying that they are the outgrowth of the social mind, to the other activities of which they in turn minister. Whoever would understand the development of Christian thought must come to his task with the mind of the historian and sociologist rather than that of the metaphysician. At the risk of again uttering an unpleasant paradox it might be said that the exclusively theological mind cannot understand theology. Such a mind is too eager for final verities and too lacking in that sensitive feeling for development which characterizes the real historian. The ultimate realities with which the theologian must deal are not ideas, but people—the same people with whom the student of society and of politics is concerned. If, as has just been said, the religious man is precisely the same man as he who marries, studies, fights, trades, pioneers, and organizes states, in all these undertakings he confesses the need of divine inspiration and consolation as well as of help and protection. For this reason whenever men have thought creatively, they have adjusted their inherited religion

to their actual needs by the use of such creative social ideas as dominated their active life.

The theological discipline generally known as the history of doctrine has been regarded with considerable justice as unattractive and confused. In large measure this misinterpretation is due to the failure of the historians of doctrine to approach their subject from the point of view of social history. The ordinary divisions of a history of doctrine are obviously made as if the doctrinal life moved in a superterrestrial course, touching the earth only here and there, as some great mountain-like cause or change reaches up to interfere with its progress. A better, and I believe much more vital, method is to approach the history of doctrine from the point of view of social evolution, and determine its main divisions by a succession of actually creative social minds. Only in this way can we be saved from the temptation to regard doctrine as something apart from religion, and religion as something apart from the totality of human experience.

I use the term "social mind" as one of those convenient generalizations which make it possible to refer to something we cannot exactly define. I mean by it a more or less general community of conscious states, processes, ideas, interests, and ambitions which to a greater or less degree repeats itself in the experience of individuals belonging to the group characterized by this community of consciousness.

Such a point of view may seem at first glance conventional, because, as a rule, doctrines have been formulated by a social body—the church. Christianity, unlike systems of philosophy, is an institutional religion, with customs, rites, organizations, authoritative councils, officials, and hierarchies. The relation of doctrine to this remarkable society within society is that of governing ideals in general to a great social group. It is creative, controlling, directive; in a word, functional. Only, the church has been a so much more coherent body than most social groups that it has formulated its regulation and constituent principles with as much precision and authority as the state itself.¹

¹ This statement is true distributively of the various bodies bearing the name Christian, whether Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, or Protestant. Radical democrats like the Baptists, it is true, have never organized a central authoritative body, yet each church exercises an authority over its members in all matters recognized

This fact, which has been the recognized basis of all church and doctrinal history, leads us, however, to another fact, by no means generally recognized, viz., that church history, and with it the history of doctrine, are phases of the general social history. If we understand this social history we shall better understand ecclesiastical development; and vice versa, as we understand the doctrinal formulations of the social entity discoverable in some church or denomination, we can understand its influence upon the development of social life. *Doctrine is the result of a dominant social mind at work in religion.*

From the point of view of social history we see a succession of creative social minds operating in the Western world during the life of Christianity; the Semitic monarchical, which gave us the New Testament; the Hellenistic monarchical, which gave us ecumenical dogma; the imperialistic, which gave us Latin Christianity; the feudal, which served to give content to the concept of divine imperialism; the national, which gave us Protestantism; the bourgeois, which gave us modern evangelicalism and Unitarianism; and the scientific-democratic, which must give us the theology for tomorrow.

It is an interesting fact that as we look at the course of Western history during the last two thousand years, we find that each of these dominant social minds had its particular place of incubation. Syria, the Eastern and the Western Roman empires, Germany, England, and America have been the homes of successive creative social minds during the past two millennia, whether judged from the point of view of Christianity or from that of social development as a whole. It is an inevitable speculation whether the Western movement of creative social minds and newly begotten doctrines may not yet add still another phase of social as well as doctrinal development, the cosmopolitan-fraternal, which, so far as the church is concerned, will result from foreign missions and find its home in Asia. For my own part, I not only expect this new phase, but believe we are already seeing its birth.

as strictly ecclesiastical. In the case of most Christian bodies authority is based on the control of the sacraments of the church. The beginning of this authority is to be seen in Origen (if not in the Johannine literature), but it developed *pari passu* with ecclesiastical organization. Participation in the sacraments was regarded as necessary to salvation, and belief authorized by the church was a condition of such participation.

CHAPTER I

THE SEMITIC SOCIAL MIND

The Semitic social mind conceived of and organized society in terms of an oriental monarchy. It is represented in the history of ancient Semitic peoples and appears as a mold of religious thinking in the Bible in both the Old and New Testaments.

It is more or less common nowadays for men to find in the Bible, and particularly in the New Testament, a large influence of Hellenism.¹ Such influences were undoubtedly present, but they represented modifications and apologetic adjustments, rather than really creative forces. That is to say, they belong to the second rather than the first stratum of theology, the apologetic rather than the creative. In fact, I am of the opinion that there is practically no call for introducing into the constructive thought of Paul and the writer of the Johannine literature any large Greek influence. That the mysteries furnished certain analogies and thought-forms to Paul may very likely be true. Indeed, it would have been

¹ It is necessary to distinguish between this estimate of Hellenism as a creative factor in the New Testament thought and the influence of Greek thought on the development of Christianity subsequent to the middle of the second century, let us say since the appearance of the professional theologian in Alexandria and Caesarea. The rapid development of the *religionsgeschichtliche Methode* naturally implied an ingenious search for Christian origins in religious beliefs antedating the rise of Christianity. In America the early and independent studies of Paul Carus have not attracted the attention usually given pioneering efforts, but much of recent speculation will be found in germ in his essays in the *Open Court*. Kenningale Cook, in his interesting volume, *The Fathers of Jesus* (1885), also forecast the bold application of the results of the comparative study of religion to the teachings of Jesus.

The more recent development of this method as a study of Christian origins may be traced in large part to the influence of Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, particularly to the third volume on "The Dying God." It reaches its extreme form (and improbability) in Smith, *The Pre-Christian Jesus*; Drews, *The Christ Myth*; Robertson, *Pagan Christs*; Gunkel, *Schöpfung und Chaos*, and especially *Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des neuen Testaments*. Of Jeremias and his reduction of Christianity to a development of the Gilgamesh Epic, mention is made in another connection. An admirably tempered criticism of this school of historical adventures will be found

strange if this had not been the case.¹ But as Clemen says,² these references belong "not to the inmost essence of Christianity, but lie altogether more or less on its periphery." Any fair study of the New Testament times will show that the positive forces at work in the shaping up of New Testament thought as regards both structure and the type are easily derivable from apocalyptic Judaism. I think it is safe to say that those who have been the most careful students of the Jewish thought are those most convinced of the essential soundness of this opinion.³

If one comes to the original message of Christianity down the historical stream of Hebrew and Jewish religious experience he finds himself in the midst of a current of various colors. There are the original Semitic conceptions, older far than Abraham, the concepts of justice gained from the conquest of Canaan, and the struggle between the older worship of Jehovah and the religions of conquered Palestinian people,⁴ the influence of Babylonian myths, the reaction against and the partial appropriation of Greek influence, and, strangest of all, the Apocalypse. And then one

in Case, *The Historicity of Jesus*. The entire matter of the bearing of the *religionsgeschichtliche Methode* upon New Testament study is discussed by C. Clemen, *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des neuen Testaments*. Especial attention may be directed to his conclusions, p. 285.

A somewhat different and superficially more scientific method is that of Kautsky, *Geschichte des Socialismus in Einzeldarstellungen*, I, 16-40, who finds in Christianity only one of the various communistic movements of the Roman Empire in reaction against the misery caused by Roman capitalism. According to this view Jesus preached deliverance from such oppression through a renewing of the world in extreme chiliastic fashion. The church embodied this hope as a proletarian community that opposed private rights in the use of property. The Catholic church arose from this communistic movement through the rise of the clergy as a new master-class. Cf. also Kalthoff, *Die Entstehung des Christentums*, who sees no historical Jesus, but a community stirred by socialized hopes and philosophies.

A well-balanced and undogmatic treatment of the influence of Hellenism on the earlier stages of the development of Christianity will be found in Case, *The Evolution of Early Christianity*.

¹ For a temperate discussion of this fascinating subject reference can well be made to Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery Religions*.

² *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments*, p. 289.

³ Cf. Bousset, *Anti-Christ*; Abelson, *The Immanence of God in Rabbinic Literature*.

⁴ Cf. Wallis, *The Sociological Study of the Bible*.

will see that all these streams have united into one great current—that of the messianic hope.

It is difficult for one not sympathetic with a genuinely historical method to approach the messianic hope with the strictly historical spirit. From the days of the primitive Christian the Old Testament has been subjected to all sorts of ingenious interpretations calculated to substantiate the Christian belief that Jesus was the Christ foretold in the Old Testament. Allegory, rabbinical ingenuity, interpretations of texts wrenched from their context, *ex post facto* exegesis¹—all are theological and apologetic, rather than strictly historical, in method. While, therefore, it has been universally held that Christianity was the fruitage of Hebraism, it has seemed necessary to our preachers to interpret Hebraism from the point of view of a doctrinally developed Christianity, rather than to approach Christianity from an impartial historical study of Judaism. Of late years, however, with the rise of the historical method of the study of religion, this defect is being rapidly remedied, and in the last fifteen years we have had placed at our disposal a very considerable Jewish literature which enables us to understand accurately the content of the messianic hope which conditioned the thought of the early Christians.

The messianic hope, or Messianism, is the dominant political hope of the Jews erected into an interpretation of religion. Such transformation is by no means uncommon. Geography itself has yielded to this transcendental treatment. To most of us Zion is heaven, and to cross Jordan is to die. The process by which the political hopes of the Jews became a religious concept may be sketched as follows: The Jew believed that Jehovah was the only God, and that the Jewish nation was his favored people. The problem of the misfortunes of the Jewish people was answered by the great prophets of the Exile in terms of a discipline preparatory

¹ See for instance the interpretation of the red string of Rahab by Clement of Rome, the prophecy of the death of Jesus as seen by Barnabas in the number of Abraham's servants, Justin's discovery of a forecast of the cross in various articles of common use, and the ingenious allegories of Origen. The method of finding messianic prophecies in whatever in the Old Testament could be seen to resemble events in the life of Jesus appears in Peter's address at Pentecost, and in many of the "fulfilling" passages of Matthew.

to a national resurrection. The persecutions to which loyal Jews were subjected under Antiochus Epiphanes, had to be faced with the spirit of faith, or else with that of frank repudiation of Jehovah's power to save his people. To their eternal credit the humble folk who revolted against the Syrians and their own time-serving religious leaders, even in the presence of death never lost faith in a national deliverance by their God. Since their time there have been plenty of people who have believed in a heaven where as individuals they would be recompensed for the misfortunes of this life, but the Jew believed that God would save, not only Jews, but the Jewish nation itself. The more these believing souls were oppressed, the more they rested in this assurance; the more impossible became success through civil war, the more they expected deliverance by miracle. So there grew up this belief in the future kingdom of the Jews, a kingdom in which the poor were no longer subject to the rich, but only to the rule of God—the veritable Kingdom of God.

True, there were those who, like the Zealots, were not content to await miracles. Patient faith like that of the Pharisee is the property of the bourgeois class, not that of the masses. The remedy to which the proletarian group looks is revolution. When motives to such direct action are reinforced by fanaticism, religious war is inevitable. To appreciate this, one has only to recall the spread of Mohammedanism among the Semitic folk, and the Peasants' Revolt in Europe just before and during the time of Luther. Such was the situation among the Jewish people in the first century. The account given by Josephus of the movements among the Jewish people from the time of Herod to the time of Titus bristles with the stories of revolts under the leadership of those who strove for national deliverance. But men like Judas, the Egyptian, Eleazar, and Simon Ben Gioras were something more than mere revolutionists. They were messianists. Not expecting to win without divine help, theirs was the desperate philosophy of a hopeless people. If, as they believed, they could institute insurrection in which there came to be no alternative except national destruction or divine deliverance, then the divine deliverance would come. The revolt of 66-70 A.D. was not that of comfortable

bourgeois folk, although, like the French bourgeoisie in 1789-92 their leaders attempted at the start to control it and keep it from excesses. But the combination of religious fanaticism and social desperation was too great for the priests and Josephus, and, as later political madness was to prove too great for Lafayette, swept on to the expected alternative, destruction or miracle. But in the moment of supreme crisis for the nation, God did not intervene; there was no miracle and the Jewish nation perished.

Christianity as a religion did not spring from this proletarian passion. This fact the Gospels make plain beyond reasonable doubt. The messianic hope of the Pharisee was the real progenitor of the messianic faith of the Christian. It abhorred revolution and believed that the Messiah when he came, without trusting to weapons, would slay men by the breath of his mouth.¹ When he would come, and when God should work, through him, the deliverance, they did not know. Some among them evidently believed it would be soon; others were content to await the divinely appointed time. And thus, unaware of the fate that was to overwhelm them, they solaced themselves with the strange prophecies of the Apocalypticists, and devoted themselves to the elaboration of legal righteousness. Until the awful Day of Judgment dawned the pious Jew must keep the Law. But to Pharisees, as to Zealots, the Kingdom expected was not our modern heaven, but a real social order blessed with what to our more critical, scientific minds seem very incongruous details.²

This blinding hope as to the future was made by the early church the mold for shaping its interpretation of the significance of Jesus. He was the Christ; that is, *the One empowered by God by His own resident spirit to establish his Kingdom*. The fact that he was crucified without any such kingdom appearing did not destroy confidence in his ultimate triumph. Never having expected him to lead a political revolution, his disciples had no difficulty in transferring to his and their future the fulfilment of those hopes

¹ Cf. Psalms of Solomon, p. 17.

² It seems difficult for many theologians to see the symbolic rather than literal character of these hopes. On this aspect of the matter I would refer interested readers to my *Messianic Hope in the New Testament*, and *The Gospel and the Modern Man*.

of a new Jerusalem and of a new Kingdom which they had inherited from the Jewish Apocalypses. His death and resurrection were interpreted to be an ascent to the heavenly world from which he sent the Holy Spirit and would presently return to establish the new Kingdom upon Jewish soil.

It was this hope which led the primitive church at Jerusalem to regard membership among the Jewish people as necessary to membership in the coming Kingdom. Paul, however, saw more clearly the true implication of this hope and declared that membership in the Kingdom was not limited to Jews, but was open to all those who acknowledged the lordship of Jesus, that is, believed in his messiahship.

If one comes to the thought of Paul and the early gentile churches by way of this historical approach, it is clear that Christianity on its formal side was precisely what Paul described it to be—the hope of the coming of Christ to establish his Kingdom. Of the content of this hope we shall not speak in detail. I wish only to call attention to the striking fact that its form was derived from Judaism, the scenario of a world-drama with God and Satan, Christ and Anti-Christ,¹ angels and devils, saints and sinners, as the chief actors. Those who had broken the law of God were to be punished, unless forgiven by him. But forgiveness was to be accomplished through the Christ, who was both prince and sacrifice. A Judgment Day was to be established in which the whole world was to be judged by Jesus the Christ; and after the final conflict the king and the hosts of the hostile kingdom were to be cast down into everlasting fire. The faithful subjects of the Messiah were to share in his triumph and even if dead were to be given new bodies, no longer flesh and blood, in which they could forever enjoy the bliss of the new life in the Kingdom ushered in at the “revelation of the Lord.”

It requires no detailed knowledge of oriental history to see how genuinely oriental are the elements of this scenario. Fortunately,

¹ On this highly important figure cf. Bousset, *Anti-Christ*, and articles in Bible dictionaries. In many cases he symbolized some definite person. As a commentary on this fact reference may be made to the fact that in Lavater's picture of the advent of the Anti-Christ, Goethe recognized the entry of the Kurfürst into Frankfort for the coronation of Joseph II (Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 382).

it is by no means the only, or, for that matter, the essential, element of Christianity; but it is none the less the framework of our inherited orthodox theology. Lord, Christ, Holy Spirit, law, disobedience, forgiveness, justification, heaven, hell, Satan, and angels—these make up the vocabulary of Christian theology, and the concepts they express were literalized analogies drawn from the experiences of the oriental state. Messianism, even in its Christian form, is thus a Semitic political concept transcendentalized into a scenario of the world-drama.

The persistence of this belief was unaffected by the philosophical and apologetic development of some of its elements. The earliest baptismal formula, the old Roman symbol, the Rule of Faith which developed into the Apostolic Creed and the Nicene Creed, included the elements of this dramatic expectation in which was set forth the redemptive work of God through Jesus. The expectation of the immediate second coming of Christ still holds sway in Clement of Rome.¹

Justin Martyr expects a return of Jesus with the same literalness as did the early Christians.² Irenaeus³ states expressly that “among the beliefs of the church is the belief that Christ will come again and condemn the unrighteous to everlasting fire.” Tertullian⁴ abounds in references to the second coming of Christ, although he recognizes how ridiculous the expectation may seem to the heathen. He refers to the coming of Christ and the consequent resurrection as the end of the world at the Judgment Day.⁵ Origen⁶ in describing the popular Christianity asks, “Who is ignorant of the statement that Jesus was born of a virgin and that He was crucified and that His resurrection is an article of faith among many, that a general judgment is announced to come, in which the wicked are to be punished according to their deserts, and the righteous to be duly rewarded?”

¹ I Clem., chap. 23: “Of a truth, soon and suddenly shall His will be accomplished, as the Scripture also bears witness, saying, ‘Speedily will He come, and will not tarry’; and ‘The Lord shall suddenly come to His temple, even the Holy One, for whom ye look.’”

² See, for instance, *Dial. with Trypho* 28, 31, 35, 45, 49, 52, 58; *Apol.* 50, 51, 52.

³ *Ag. Her.* I, chap. 10.

⁵ *Ag. Marcion* III, 8, 24.

⁴ *Apol.* 21, 23, 47.

⁶ *Ag. Celsus*, I, 7.

This messianic program survived the period of the early church Fathers and has remained a constant element in the faith of Christianity. Throughout the history of the church there have been those who have made it paramount and have awaited the immediate fulfilment of the prophecies it involved. Chiliastic groups, however, have always been regarded with suspicion by the church, which has preferred to hold the primitive messianic faith as a sort of foreshortened prophecy. The general course of doctrinal development has not been in the field of this Semitic eschatology, but rather in those earlier formulas of the baptismal confession which had to do with God and Jesus.

CHAPTER II

THE GRECO-ROMAN SOCIAL MIND

The second dominant creative social mind was the Greco-Roman, or that of the eastern half of the Roman Empire.

It is impossible to understand thoroughly the history of the Christian church, on either its institutional or doctrinal side, without a first-hand acquaintance with the course of history during the two centuries which elapsed between the formation of the Johannine literature and the Council of Nicea. In this period we see not only the rise of authority in the shape of a canonical literature and the episcopacy but similarly in the case of doctrine the transition from the creative, through the apologetic and the metaphysical, to the stage of dogma. In a word, we see the rise of that combination of political and ecclesiastical authority upon which all orthodoxy has rested—an authority that so far displaced reason that no less than Augustine could exclaim: "I could not even believe the gospel unless the church had declared it to me."¹

This period, so fraught with consequences to the church, breaks naturally into two stages. There is first the apologetic, the chief object of which was the establishment, chiefly by appeal to the Old Testament, of the validity of the Christian hope, as contained in the messianic drama-creed. By the middle of the second century this vertebral group of beliefs had been organized into a symbol form, which, while commonly called the "old Roman symbol," was, as a matter of fact, held essentially by all the churches. It was the Rule of Faith—that which was everywhere,

¹ The early stage of this authoritative attitude of Christian teaching is clearly indicated by Origen, *Ag. Cel.*, I, 10. "We admit that we teach those men to believe without reasons who are unable to abandon all other employments and give themselves to the examination by arguments." Clement of Alexandria had before Origen called the ideal Christian a gnostic in much the same sense that Epictetus had called his ideal man a cynic. But such authority is very different from that of ecclesiasticism and may be regarded as indicative of the transition in the estimate of church authority from, let us say, Clement of Rome to Cyprian.

always, and by all received. The object of apologists like Aristides and Justin Martyr was to set forth the reasonableness of this dramatic hope. Their arguments served as a transition from the earlier messianic to the later philosophical Christianity, but they did not invent any doctrine. Their work was essentially defensive and their argument was largely taken up with ingenious interpretations of Old Testament passages in the interest of showing that Jesus fulfilled prophecy.

The situation changed radically when, in the latter part of the second century, the second stage was ushered in by the appearance of professional theological teachers like Pantaenus, Clement of Alexandria, and, above all, Origen. From that time on the doctrinal formulation of Christianity has been largely in the hands of theological professors and ecclesiastics. But the really creative men have, as a rule, not been mere classroom lecturers, important as they have been as systemizers of doctrine. The work of creative theology has been done by men who have been actually in touch with the dominant social mind of their times. Under their influence each new development of doctrine has been the social expression of Christian experience of successive epochs.

In this period such men were, for example, Athanasius, Hosius, and Leo. Indeed, it is worth noticing that for the creation of doctrines the creative social mind has always focalized itself, so to speak, in some strong soul who was preacher as well as lecturer. Recall the noble succession—Ambrose, Augustine, Bernard, Huss, Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, Wesley, Schleiermacher, Bushnell.

These two centuries mark the culmination of the Greco-Roman world, but it was a subdued world, denied political and social expression. Even so great an emperor as Trajan feared to let a group of men organize as a fire company.¹ True, we should not overlook the *collegia* of the Empire or the various communistic or semi-communistic groups among the Gnostics, e.g., the Carpocratians. But these *collegia* did not represent creative social forces. In so far as these existed they expressed themselves non-socially. As far as Christianity is concerned they may be neglected except as incidental influences at work in church organization. The class

¹ See his rescript in reply to the inquiry of Pliny.

struggles of the Empire resulting in proletarian economic-religious groups may have aided the spread of the Christian churches, but they do not seem to have shaped the religion as a whole, much less its doctrinal development.¹ Yet doubtless the opposition to the developing church sprang from the antipathy and apprehension displayed by the Roman state to proletarian *cultus* groups and unlicensed religions. About the only organizations viewed with any sort of complacency by the imperial government were the burial societies, and it was as such that the churches were repeatedly given a quasi-legal position during the period in which they were really outside the law.²

The impossibility of partaking in actual social transformation and public discussion of large issues naturally served to divert the active minds of these two centuries into the non-political channels of law, rhetoric, and particularly a philosophy which dealt with innocuous matters above experience.³ It is difficult for us in this day, when nearly every man and woman has a theory for the reorganization of society, to realize how intellectual activity could have been concentrated thus upon non-social interests. But the fact stands out in the history of the time beyond question. And it was this non-political social mind, alert, intense, and, within the church, absorbed in beliefs formulated in the Rule of Faith, that undertook the shaping up, at first apologetically and then creatively, of the doctrine of God and of the person of Jesus. Its development was determined by the twofold tendency: a search for a metaphysically absolute God-essence and an equally observable search through the mystery-religions for a salvation from natural evils through union with God.

1. The first serious issue that arose in Christian thinking after the early discussion of the first quarter of the second century concerned the identity of God the Creator and God the Savior; i.e., of Jehovah and the Father revealed in Jesus. To the culti-

¹ Cf. Wendland, *Das griechische Vereinswesen*; Poland, *Geschichte des griechischen Vereinswesen*; and the admirable discussion of Troeltsch, *Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, I, 15 ff.

² Cf. résumé in Hatch, *Early Organization of the Christian Churches*; Dill, *Social Life of the Roman Empire*.

³ Cf. the satire of Epictetus, *Discourses* II, 19; III, 21, 23.

vated and speculative minds of the second century the difficulty of seeing love in the natural order was as great as in our own days. The Gnostics, or, as we might possibly call them today, the "illumined," attempted to answer the question by cutting the Gordian knot. They declared that the God of Jesus was not the God of the Old Testament who had created the universe; that the latter was a wicked demiurge and not a good God. The arguments with which the early apologists of the growing Catholic orthodoxy, like Tertullian and Irenaeus, opposed this highly speculative view preserve in great detail the amazing symbolism of the gnostic philosophy. It was not difficult to point out absurdities in the various hierarchies of personified abstractions, virtues, and evils, but the unavoidable meaning of Jesus was grasped more directly by the common mind of the church. There could be but one God, and he must be both Creator and Savior. It is this impregnable conviction reached by the early church, so threatened with academic vagaries, which appears in the first sentences of the ecumenical creeds: "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth."

The struggle with Gnosticism led to emphasis of legitimate philosophy which centered about the Logos. The Logos it was which enabled the theologians to answer the question how the absolute God could save men by union with them. The philosopher became the theologian, as in Justin Martyr, and the prevalent interest in metaphysics gave to the conception of "essence" in contrast with "attribute" a supremacy in Christian thought until, and indeed in orthodox theology even after, Kant's criticism had exiled the distinction from constructive philosophical thought.¹ By

¹ The attitude of the church toward philosophers passed through various stages. At first the similarities between Greek and Christian teaching were attributed to the work of the Logos (e.g., Tertullian and Justin Martyr). Later these similarities were attributed to the work of demons who sought to hinder the revelation of the Logos through Jesus (e.g., Clement of Alexandria), or to plagiarism on the part of the philosophers, particularly Plato, who learned about Moses from Jeremiah while on a visit to Egypt (e.g., Augustine, *Christian Doctrine* II, 28; *Civ. Dei* VII, 11; *Retrac.* II, 4). During the Middle Ages both Plato and Aristotle were used authoritatively by the theologians (e.g., Thomas Aquinas and the later schoolmen). Aristotle was declared to be "the precursor of Christ in things natural as John the Baptist was in things of grace" (quoted by Sheldon, *History of Doctrine*, I, 306). For Augustine's argument as to the right of the theologian to use profane facts, see his *Christian Doctrine* II, 18-40.

transforming the Messiah into the Logos of current philosophy and Alexandrine apologetic, and by then expressing the relations of the Logos to God the Father in terms of generation, the Greco-Roman social mind gave to the world a really new doctrine of God.

The metaphysical interest was not exhausted, indeed was hardly involved, in the discussion with the Gnostics. Whereas they had sought to bridge the chasm between a metaphysical Absolute and the world by means of symbol and theosophical speculation, the "legitimists" among philosophers followed along lines determined by the classical philosophers. Stoicism and Platonism were here in evidence, but the general intellectual movement of the time was eclectic. The philosophy which developed the mold in which restless speculations of the Eastern empire expressed themselves was centered around a concept which was begotten of the union of the Stoic Logos and the Platonic Idea.

The interest of the second-century theology in the Logos was undoubtedly due to the use of that term in the Fourth Gospel. But its appearance there is merely one phase of the general intellectual interest that was given a theological tendency in Alexandrian thought by Philo. From Stoicism had come the conception of the seminal Logos; that is, the seed out of which all things were to grow and become more perfect. From this conception it had been easy to think of the one Logos as embracing subordinate Logoi which did for the parts of the cosmos what the Logos itself did for the universe as a whole. It was not difficult for a syncretic age to carry this doctrine of Logoi into the realm of Platonism and to identify them with the Ideas which in the later form of Platonism had come to be regarded as mediators between God and matter. To this later syncretic thought, therefore, God was an absolute and transcendent being who created the universe by and supported it through the Logos and the Logoi.

It was at this point that Philo had laid hold upon the concept as a means of clothing Hebrew thought in philosophical guise. It was not far from Logoi to angels and at times Philo seems to have identified them, but the two concepts are not at bottom the same and the real point of contact between Philo and this syncretic philosophy is in his teaching as to the Logos. According to Philo

the Logos was the time-embracing divine intelligence, nature on its active side, the shadow of God, the instrument through which God made the world, the firstborn of God.¹

This conception of the Logos apparently had the same position in the second-century thought that evolution possesses in modern thought. Indeed, we should not go far astray if we were to say that in Greek thought Logos came to fulfil practically the same function as Law fulfils in modern. Philo, it is true, sometimes practically personifies the Logos, but it would be a mistake to press his occasional expressions too far. Similarly in the case of the early church, to apologists like Justin Martyr the Logos is a revelation of divine perfection. Christians therefore have a knowledge of the entire Logos, but the Greek philosophers have only a part of the Logos.²

By the use of this Logos conception the Greco-Roman mind was able to accommodate to its general mode of thinking the new belief in Jesus as the revelation of God. That is to say, without giving up the messianic formula the Greco-Roman mind proceeded to satisfy its own religious need by recasting it in accordance with the Logos philosophy. Jesus the Christ became the incarnate Logos, and the only question which remained was the precise relationship of the Logos to God's substance. This substance was to be seen in God the Father, but was it to be seen in the Logos?

It would be a mistake to think of this question as one of mere academic and speculative interest. It was involved in the fundamental religious experience of the Greco-Roman world. The Hebrew thought of the incoming of God in a human life was in terms of unction or the enduement of the Spirit. The Greco-Roman world thought in terms of incarnation. But to both, particularly to the Greco-Roman mind, there still remained the quest for God. Religious needs could be settled only by God. If, therefore, the satisfaction of the human need by the incarnate Logos was really to be valid, it could only be because the Logos was really of the

¹ See Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas*, etc., p. 250; Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*, II, 79.

² *Apol.* II, 8. Cf. Irenaeus *Ag. Her.* IV; III, 56. Justin Martyr even goes so far as to speak of the Logos as the second God: *Apol.* I, 22, 23, 32; cf. *Ag. Trypho* 50.

God-substance. Polytheism was of course excluded by Christianity, and the quest of Greco-Roman Christianity resolved itself into a search for the divine essence in the Logos as a means of validating its experienced satisfaction of its religious needs through its acceptance of Jesus the Logos.

Into the century-long discussion which this quest involved it is not necessary to enter. But in the very nature of the case Arianism, as an expedient which argued that the satisfaction of the religious needs of the Greco-Roman world could be met by a fellowship with the one who was not in essence God, was doomed. No formula would answer ultimately except that which could satisfy the metaphysical need of the creative Greco-Roman mind. Orthodoxy as shaped up at Nicea, it is true, was enforced by civil and military power, but the logic of the situation was in its favor. Arianism, which attempted to place a creature where the human heart had already experimentally discovered a God, would have gone the way of polytheism, even if there had been no political reinforcement of theological teaching. And in passing it should not be forgotten that Arianism itself sought to establish itself by the same appeal to force.

2. But the Greco-Roman mind was more than abstractedly metaphysical. If it found in the Logos the means of satisfying its rational demand for a God who was absolute, it was at the same time increasingly in search of a God who could save and cleanse his worshipers by actual contact. However popular philosophy was, religion was even more popular. But the religion which made such phenomenal strides throughout the Roman Empire during the first two or three centuries of our era was not that of the classical mythology. True, there was a revival of this ancient faith, as indicated by the rebuilding of temples by men like Pliny, but the religions which really were developing within the Greco-Roman world were those which promised salvation through identification of the worshiper with the deity through the mystery. These mystery-religions were, like Judaism, oriental. From Egypt came the religion of Isis and Osiris; from Persia, that of Mithras; from Syria and Asia Minor those of Attys and of Cybele. All of these religions had their mystery-cult. To aid the new religious search

for salvation the old Greek mysteries took on new popularity. Men who had lost faith in the gods of mythology and were under the stress of their philosophical search for ultimate reality were developing imperative religious needs.¹

This new desire for salvation accounts in no small measure, not only for the spread of Christianity, but for the fashion in which metaphysical questions were discussed. On the one side there could be only one God, and on the other this God was metaphysically transcendent. The Greco-Roman mind endeavored to make personal fellowship with this absolute God real, as a means of rescue from death and evil. The mysteries accomplished this to a very considerable degree, but probably had more influence in creating that sense of need of salvation which was so widespread throughout the Eastern empire. This sense of human nature's need became so dominant as to be really an element in the social mind and thus inevitably threw emphasis upon the doctrine of the incarnation as well as the relation of the Logos to God the Father.²

To this combination set by philosophy on the one side and the mystery-religions on the other we may attribute that intellectual tendency within Christianity which found its final expression in the ecumenical dogma of the Triune God and the later dogma of the person of Christ. But at this point the creative Greco-Roman mind gave up in despair, largely because it was without scientific method and concepts for its psychological problem. It was inevitable, therefore, that when theology faced the difficult question set by the data given it by ecumenical dogma, viz., how two natures each possessing a will could unite in one person, it should find no answer. At this point can be seen the difference

¹ Cumont, *Les Religions orientales*, draws a striking contrast between the eastern and western halves of the Roman Empire in the matter of their respective intellectual and religious life.

² To the same influence must be attributed in no small measure the development of the sacramental elements of Christianity. Baptism and the Lord's Supper, at first without full sacramental value, gradually came to possess an efficacy quite apart from theological *fides implicita*. The doctrine of the sacraments arose gradually from the usage of the churches and thus added new elements to the thought as well as the ritual of the developing religion.

between a genuine theology and the opinions of independent schools. There were plenty of teachers like Nestorius, Apollinaris, Eutyches, and Cyril who had theories as to how there could be unity of person coexistent with duality in nature, but thanks to the metaphysically less precise influence of the Western ecclesiastics, notably Leo, the church as a whole refused to accept any one of these doctrines, and at Chalcedon adopted a creed which states the elements of the question but suggests no solution. Thereafter, appeal was wholly to authority. Orthodoxy accepted the formulation on the basis of ecclesiastic decision, and never reopened the question. It had reached the Ultima Thule of the possibilities of a non-scientific social mind. Yet by these methods theology not only preserved the Greek philosophy but also became the *via media* between the two antagonistic tendencies toward literal messianism (chiliasm) and a theosophical philosophy of religion like that of Gnosticism.¹ In other words, orthodoxy came into existence because its doctrines more perfectly satisfied the religious needs set by the Greco-Roman mind than did doctrines formulated under and expressing some counter-social mind like Arianism.²

¹ The Cappadocian teachers were the most consistent representatives of this new discipline. The speculation of Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, based on the "subliminal self," is hardly an exception to this statement. Anti-orthodoxy has been either docetic, humanitarian, or champion of an unhistorical Jesus, as in Drews, Smith, and Kalthoff.

² By counter-social mind is meant one that was not at any given period dominant in the genetic development of occidental civilization.

CHAPTER III

THE IMPERIALISTIC SOCIAL MIND

The third creative social mind is that which characterized the western half of the Roman Empire and perpetuated the genius of the imperial system.

It is obvious to all students of the Roman Empire that the real world of Roman genius faced the West rather than the East. It was in Italy, Gaul, and Spain that by an epoch-making series of experiments Rome worked out the imperial idea. To the East this idea was carried in terms of proconsul and of emperor. But the ancient civilizations were too deeply ingrained to be replaced and served rather as a negative force against which the imperial idea struggled with only a superficial enforcement of itself. Its power persisted in name, but it did not create a new set of institutions that molded the foundations of society. Inevitably it was transformed into an oriental despotism in which there was no political or social development, but rather stagnation in state, society, and church. In the Western world, however, the imperial idea had really creative power. It built up a new civilization in Gaul and Britain among peoples without highly developed social institutions. It was in this same region that, after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, the social mind, filled with the ideals of the Empire, reincarnated itself in the Roman church and the Holy Roman Empire.

It is noticeable that the language of theology did not come from the philosopher so much as from the lawyer. This fact is natural because of the general tendency for theology to utilize the results of social experience and practice. It was the Western empire, however, that furnished the legal vocabulary in which so much of the philosophical speculation of the Eastern theologians was to be cast. The temper of the western half of the Roman Empire made it inevitable that the lawyer should there have preceded the metaphysician. Tertullian is pre-eminently the pioneer in this

field, which, because of the genius of Calvin and Grotius, was to yield such theological harvests. To him belongs the responsibility of contributing to the controlling vocabulary of Christianity such legal terms and concepts as *persona*, *satisfactio*, *sacramentum*, *vitium originis*. By him also legal practice was extended into the work of divine forgiveness and salvation.¹ How significant this judicial conception, born of the union of messianism and Roman law, was to become in Latin and Protestant theology is apparent to all students of the evolution of Christian doctrine.

So far as the ecumenical doctrine of the Trinity and the person of Christ are concerned, the Roman Catholic church was at one with the Greek Catholic church. It was also at one with it in its adherence to the messianic confession or the Rule of Faith. But the Roman church was always less concerned with metaphysics than with people, and it was in the western half of the Empire that Roman experience was reinstitutionalized in the church as a means of bringing salvation to a lost and corrupt race.

The beginning of this historical process is to be found in part in Cyprian's theory as to the Roman bishop. As a matter of fact, however, the movement may also be said to have begun with Tertullian's extension of legal practice and vocabulary to the new religion. But this in turn was doubtless due in part to the rise of the conception of Christians as the Third Race, the other two being the Jew and the Gentile. It is not easy to see just when this conception began to express itself, but certainly as early as the First Epistle of Peter.² Barnabas speaks of the Christians as a "new people," while the *Apology of Aristides*³ speaks of a "third race in the world."⁴

¹ For instance, *Ag. Marcion* I, 27. Speaking of the fate of the sinner in the Day of Judgment he says, "he is to be cast away out of sight. Is not even this a question of judicial determination? . . . and this sentence cannot possibly be passed upon him except by an angry and offended authority who is also the punisher of sin—that is, by a judge." In this connection mention can be made of the use made by Duns Scotus of the legal term *acceptillatio*.

² 5:7; cf. 7:5; 13:6.

³ 2 and 16.

⁴ Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagog.* I, 5. 15, 20; cf. I, 7. 58; *Strom.* VI, 5. 41; cf. III, 10. 70. See *Ep. to Diognetus* I, 5; Eusebius, *Hist. Ec.* I, 4. Tertullian, *Ad nationes* I, 8. 20, objects to being so regarded but is the first to speak of Christianity as a religion (*Apol.* 37, 38). On the whole matter see an interesting chapter in Harnack's *Expansion of Christianity*, II, chap. vi.

This development of Christianity as a separate religion carried with it the need of organization and gradually it was shaped up under the influence of the creative Roman imperialism as one aspect of the imperialistic social mind in the western half of the Empire.

As it was in the West that Roman civilization collapsed, it was no accident that at the same time that Christianity was shaping itself up as a spiritual empire it should be filled with pessimism as to human nature. Just how far Augustine may be said to have originated the doctrine of original sin will always be a subject for difference of opinion. Oriental religions which came into the Roman Empire were many of them tinged with the conviction that matter is evil, and Augustine had come under the influence of the Manichees. It is hardly possible to believe that he ever quite freed himself from the attitude of mind which this relationship engendered; but however that may be, it is incredible that living as he did in the midst of a collapsing civilization, compelled to defend Christianity from the charge of bringing about the fall of Rome, he should not have come to distrust human nature. For the same reason it was natural that he should have magnified the power and absoluteness of God. He thus gathered up into himself and expressed in doctrine the despair of a permanent social order and directed faith away from humanity to a sovereign God. The collapse of civilization with its consequent distrust of human nature and reliance upon the absolute sovereignty of God constituted a view of religion to which even the freedom of the will had to bow. Technically this freedom was preserved, since human nature, according to Augustine, never changed its essence. For all practical purposes, however, the new pessimism of Augustine, or the belief in a corrupt and helpless human nature, became a basis for institutionalized Christianity and doctrine.

For the fifteen hundred years after Augustine's day the church lived, as to a great extent it still lives, under the influence of this pessimism. The world is a fallen world; human nature is corrupt and guilty of the sin of Adam, altogether without hope apart from the election of a sovereign God.

It does not require any particular power of imagination to discover in this terrible picture of a perverted creation an attitude

of mind which had been growing ever more somber in the Roman Empire since the days of Seneca; nor is it impossible that there is also involved in this belief in hereditary guilt a survival of that legal practice in which a traitor tainted his own blood. In it the social mind of the Western Empire expressed itself and shaped its Christianity to satisfy its intellectual needs.

But this doctrine of original sin which endeavored to face and utilize what our evolutionary age would call atavism or recidivism was by no means the only influence of the imperialistic attitude of mind. The Middle Ages abound in distinct survivals, such as language, laws, philosophy, and art, of the great world which paradoxically could not reproduce itself consciously until it had ceased to be.

We must, it is true, not press too hard the element of conscious purpose in the influence of the state upon the church. The creative influences of society are within people and are embodied in institutions unconsciously as well as deliberately. As a matter of fact the ancient church regarded itself as a rival of the kingdoms of the world. Augustine's "Kingdom of God" was something more than an eschatological dream. It was in a striking degree a philosophy of history.

The idea of "the world" in Judaism and primitive Christianity is not cosmological but political and social. To these early religionists "the world" was the complex of pagan institutions as well as demonic influence with which Christianity had to deal. The effort of Gnosticism to substitute cosmological for these social ideas was doomed to failure in the same proportion as the Christian movement became self-consciously institutionalized. The Kingdom of God was conceived of in the terms of the Roman Empire, and the church increasingly became the historical expression of a transcendentalized imperialism.¹

It is thus we are brought to possibly the greatest contribution of the Roman Empire to Roman civilization—the Papacy. The conception of the Pope as the supreme lord over the universal church is itself a matter of development and to be understood from a knowledge of the struggle of the Bishop of Rome for supremacy

¹ Neumann, *Der römische Staat und die allgemeine Kirche*.

over other bishops. But this struggle with the bishops was accompanied by a struggle between the church and the state. After the attempt of Charlemagne to re-establish the Roman Empire, Europe was for hundreds of years dominated by the conception of the Holy Roman Empire in which the Pope and Emperor were co-ordinate rulers. By the pressure of the imperialistic concept, the co-ordination itself disappeared until in the triumph of the Pope over the reforming councils we see the establishment of the most complete imperialistic ideal that the world has ever known. Supported by the Knights Templar and the Knights of St. John, the Pope had a military force that made him independent of the Emperor. The Franciscans and the Dominicans freed him from dependence upon the bishops, and the Canon Law gave to the operations of the Roman church legal form and sequence possessed by no other institution of that time.

The Middle Ages owed still other elements to the imperialism of Rome. The characteristic intellectual mission of the Middle Ages was the reorganization of its heritage of classical culture.¹ The schoolmen were transcendental imperialists in thought as the churchmen were in organization. The endless discussion over universals was to an emergence of imperialism in thought somewhat like the emergence of oriental kingship in Messianism. All individuals were members of a class and existed only as involved in some universal body.²

In the light of this triumph of the imperial idea in the inner as well as the outer life of Christianity, the theology of Thomas Aquinas was inevitable. But the theology of the universal was not a theology of fraternity. Nothing could be farther from it or the social mind from which it sprang than our modern political equality. Whether in the church or in the state anything like even a partial denial of the aristocratic imperialistic conception of the state brought punishment. Arnold of Brescia, Wycliffe, and Huss would seem conservative enough as political theorists nowadays, but they all failed in their efforts to establish a broader

¹ So Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind*.

² An echo, not altogether expected, of this overvaluation of words will be found in Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Book I, chap. iv.

foundation for human society than that which either the Empire, the Papacy, or feudalism permitted.

It is altogether natural, therefore, to find that the church during the sway of this imperialistic conception was out of sympathy with movements among the masses of the peasantry looking for a larger share of social privilege; that it could send a crusade against the Albigenses as readily as against the Turks; that serfdom flourished on church estates; that even among the clergy themselves there were differences of rank and differences of morals, and that the clergy as a class were excluded from the operations of many laws and constituted an "order" with many social privileges and few social obligations. The imperialistic mind hated democracy and saw salvation only in heaven. The theology of the schoolman was avowedly interested in words as the correlate of truth and from the transcendent intellectualism of its schools and abbeys saw in humanity only a mass of perdition.

CHAPTER IV

THE FEUDAL SOCIAL MIND

But imperialism did not work out its influence unaffected. As in so many other countries where a civilization is based upon land tenure and military service, there developed alongside of this great imperialistic ideal a mass of political and social conventions which was the woof worked across the warp of the Holy Roman Empire, giving to it color and firmness of texture.

The rise of feudalism is always an indication of a quasi-capitalistic organization of society based on land tenure, but the forces of such capitalism are frankly military and their real grip upon the masses is through land rather than machinery. As a social theory feudalism was not without its attractiveness. Men were bound together in an elaborate scale of classes, each related to the one above or below it in terms of service and protection. Thus the lord protected his vassals in return for the service owed him by the vassals, the vassal cared for his under-vassal and the peasantry on his estates who, even more than our wage-earning classes of today, supported the weight of an entire social system with practically no rights except those of bare existence. Feudalism could not exist except in an agricultural and military period when manufactures were unknown, but it was prolific of social distinctions possessed of hardy life.¹ In the day before wealth was chiefly derived from commerce or industrialism the structure of society was fixed in terms, not of wages and capital, but of privilege and obligation to an almost incredible degree. "The castle on the hill and the hut in the valley" came to be regarded as a divinely established order of society. God must of necessity have seemed far away from the peasant who looked up at him through the hierarchy of a feudal system of which he partook only as an unprivileged and oppressed member. Within the church as well as out of it there was a hierarchy of obligation with its rising scale

¹ The only thoroughly systematized feudal state was the kingdom of Jerusalem.

of honor. The worth of a man was determined, not by what he himself could do or what he actually was as an individual, but by his position in society. The bishop had more honor than the priest; the duke than the knight. And this honor was to be preserved from all indignity. It had its rights, inviolable and unforgiving. To fail to render due obligations was an injury both to the person and to the honor of the lord; and before the guilt of such action was past the debt must be paid both in terms of the expected service and in satisfaction of the injured honor.¹

It was at this point that feudalism reached over and laid its hand upon theology, just as it laid its hand upon social evolution. Anselm's theory of satisfaction-atonement was nothing more nor less than an extension of feudal obligations into religion. Just as the constitutionless king was bound to his lower nobles and his people by feudal relations, so God, according to Anselm, is related to his world. Men owe perfect obedience to him. The slightest violation, even though it were by a look, is an injury to his infinite honor. As, according to the feudal code, all injuries to honor demanded rigorous satisfaction proportionate in value to the honor that had been injured, so the satisfaction which humanity must pay to God whose honor it had injured by its refusal to pay its proper obedience is beyond the power of humanity to pay. Therefore God the Son became incarnate in Jesus, and the theanthropic person Jesus is able both to render perfect obedience for himself and to die as a man an unmerited death the worth of which is sufficient to make the necessary satisfaction to the divine honor. Still pursuing the feudal conception, Anselm holds that since Jesus in thus dying did something which he was under no obligation to do, he has the right to claim a guerdon. This guerdon was the right to save certain persons who will thus make up the perfect number of the angels which had been reduced by the fall of Satan and his followers.

¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Book I, chap. x, has an interesting list of descriptions of things honorable and dishonorable. The former he holds are those that recognize power on the part of another. Thus feudalism furnished many of the political presuppositions of the new era. It is interesting to recall also that Locke, *Essay on Government*, II, makes the two inalienable and undying bases of government the natural rights to punish and to seek reparation for injuries.

CHAPTER V

THE NATIONALIST SOCIAL MIND

The universal ideals of the Roman Empire were permanently lodged in the social history only of those countries which, like Gaul, Italy, and Spain, had become thoroughly Romanized. Outside of the limits of the Roman Empire as perpetuated by the Hapsburgs the Roman institutions and the Roman church were never as deeply rooted as within the limits of the ancient Empire itself. The disintegration of the imperial idea was due to forces within as well as without the Empire. In the first place, the rise of the cities to wealth through commerce gave them means of withstanding successfully even so powerful a monarch as Frederic II. In the course of time these great cities like Paris, Florence, Venice, Pisa, Milan, Padua, Genoa, Nuremberg, Augsburg, came to an independence which, in the case of some of the German cities, continues even in the present German Empire.¹ This municipal development was to have great influence in many ways, but rather in the field of art and politics than in that of religion. The new capitalistic dynasties like the Medici and the Borgias were too closely allied with the fortunes of the Papacy to break with the Church of Rome.² In Germany the free cities furnished to the world little that was really significant in political organization. The commercial mind even in the cities was not able to dominate the state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a few centuries later. The decentralizing forces which were to establish so firmly the multitude of antagonistic states with their state churches was particularly in evidence in the territory which, like Germany, except in the Decumatian land and Scandinavia, had never been integrated in the Roman

¹ In England cities were given representation in Parliament by Simon de Montfort in 1265, but the fact that the elections were returned through the sheriff of the county prevented the English cities from forming corporations acting in their own behalf and developing into a separate estate, as in France.

² The episode of Savonarola is typical alike of the rising but inchoate power of the populace and of the community of interest of the Papacy and municipal rulers.

Empire or, like England, had seen Roman institutions annihilated by Northern invaders. To some degree this remarkable fact may be due to physical differences between the inhabitant of the Empire and the northern countries. Certainly it is noteworthy that the Teutonic stock became Protestants while the Celtic remained loyal to the Papacy.¹ But whatever physical differences there may have existed in the various stocks predestining them to loyalty or to hostility to the Empire, the course of social and political development seems quite sufficient to account for the disappearance of the imperial conception as a creative force during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

On the other hand, feudalism broke of its own weight. The Crusades had impoverished feudal lords and left the great fiefs mortgaged or subdivided among subvassals. The conquest of the great feudal lords by the kings produced in France, Spain, and England a new type of monarchical organization. Although England from the thirteenth to the middle of the fifteenth century had developed an incipient constitution that gave the king, backed by the knights and boroughs, exceptional powers as over against the great barons, the development had been checked by the Wars of the Roses, and in the sixteenth century France was really the leader in the development of the new conceptions of monarchy. From the struggle of its king with the great feudal lords there emerged the first state in the modern sense. Monarchy in England and Spain developed simultaneously, but France was certainly in advance of both, and became a model for all European monarchies.²

In Germany the monarchical idea was very slow in developing. The idea of a community of German interests, though always

¹ Taylor, *Origin of the Aryans*, p. 247-49, carries this generalization back into a distinction in shapes of heads, the Teutonic Protestants being dolichocephalic and the Celtic Latins and Slavic Greek Orthodox being brachycephalic. But this sort of observation seems hardly convincing. Were the Huguenots dolichocephalic?

² The House of Lancaster attempted to rule England constitutionally, but its failure paved the way for the newer and the less English conception of government of the Tudors. The end of feudalism as a dominant conception of government in England, however, was as early as 1290, when the statute *Quia Emptoris* forbade subinfeudation and every subvassal became an immediate vassal of the crown.

present, was never strong enough to bring about more than short-lived unities between the various duchies and small estates. The right to select the emperor through the seven Electors gave only a quasi-unity to the German people and did not serve to bind them with any very strong allegiance to the Empire when once it had passed into the hands of so definitely a nationalistic figure as Philip II.

This development of a real state with monarch, taxes, statutes, officials whose relations were not feudal, and cities no longer all but independent, served to give a new importance to law. In the place of honor came legality; in the place of service came taxes; in the place of vassal came lords, estates, and parliaments; in the place of the feudal suzerain standing at the pinnacle of the feudal pyramid came the monarch-king, who ruled directly over his people although granting privileges to such nobles as he dared not deny.¹

This new and creative social mind not only constituted modern political Europe but also expressed itself in religion. First of all, it re-created, reinforced, and legitimized the monarchical conception of God. When we pass from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century we see how this conception of law in the various monarchies had become under the stress of circumstances hardly more than an obligation to punish. The nation's relation to the king was that of taxpayer, soldier, and subject. One of the chief elements in the new conception of the monarchy was the maintenance of order by punishment. The power to punish was the basis of legality. Domestic order was maintained by the executioner and gallows studded every new state; imprisonment was not favored; criminals were tortured and killed. International order was attempted through a succession of cruel and bloodthirsty wars waged between the various nations. Instead of the private warfare between feudal

¹ The hostility shown by this new monarchical movement toward movements among the people is obvious. It appeared also in the field of religion. The Reformation movement was not a movement in the interests of democratic liberty, either in state or in church. Compare Luther's attitude toward the peasants and the general opposition toward the Anabaptist movement which despite certain extravagances must be regarded as a forerunner of political and social liberty. Cf. Bax, *Rise and Fall of Anabaptists* (from a socialist point of view).

sovereigns there were now national wars in which one king endeavored to punish or despoil his neighbor.

Thus the age grew brutal as it grew nationalistic; and the king grew to be a punitive agent as he became the representative of the new reliance upon law.

These conceptions as to what monarchy was and must be passed over into the field of theology. How true this is at once appears as one compares the feudal theory of the atonement held by Anselm with the new punitive justice-satisfying theory of the atonement preached by the Reformers, and the doctrine of God so profoundly organized by Thomas Aquinas with that of Deism or the federal theology.¹ The sovereignty of God was seen through the social mind which begot the monarchies of Elizabeth, James I, and Charles I in England, Henry IV and the Bourbons in France, and Charles V and Philip II in Spain. It was a bloody period without the sense of honor which feudalism developed, but with the direct, Nitzschean quality which commercialism so inevitably begets.

Two theological corollaries were derived by the social mind from its concept of monarchical authority. The first was the view of Grotius, the father of international law. It was no accident that the man that should thus voice the growing sense of a law above the nations should regard law itself as a final good and conceive the death of Christ as vindicating God's respect for his own law. The second corollary was to be seen in the new authority given the Bible by the Protestant theologians. The sovereignty of God in the Roman Catholic church found its expression in a great ecclesiastical institution with the Pope as its head. In Protestantism authority could not adhere in any church organization, and in consequence Protestants elevated the Bible to the position which it has ever since held in orthodox Protestantism.

In the second place, this new national spirit lay back of the Reformation with its revolt from the imperial church and its establishment of national churches.

Neither Luther nor Calvin nor, in fact, any Reformer except members of the Anabaptists, were interested in separating the church

¹ Particular reference should here be made to Hobbes's discussion of sovereignty in the *Leviathan*.

from the state. The principle enunciated in Germany that the religion of the prince was to be the religion of the people constituted a serious check upon religious liberty. Whether we look to Germany, Scandinavia, England, Wales, Scotland, or Geneva, wherever the Protestant movement went in Europe it resulted in the establishment of churches under the support and protection of the state. This situation is obviously only the expression in terms of ecclesiastical organization of the changes which were taking place within the region of politics. The imperial church continued in regions in Southern Europe, but the monarchy in the non-Romanized states reproduced itself in national churches and to some extent in national theologies.¹

In the third place, this nationalist movement developed a theory of the state destined to work important changes in the seventeenth and particularly the eighteenth century. This theory is that of a Social Compact or Covenant. This theory may have originated in the theory of the church found in Hooker and subsequently developed by Hobbes and Locke. Quite as likely, however, both in church and in state the Covenant-philosophy originated in the dominating ideas of a society passing from the feudal order. In this relation, particular reference might be made to the bargains made by the rising monarchs with the Commons in return for taxes, as well as similar bargains made with cities by the monarchs. The rise of Parliament in England and of the free cities in Germany is an illustration of this tendency to base political relations upon definite contracts. The church, of course, here reacted upon the state, which in turn furnished satisfactory examples with which to describe divine government. At all events, this political theory of Covenants had back of it an actual social experience and can easily be traced in the states organized by English Separatists. Thus, in 1606, by "Covenant of the Lord" the English separatists organized two churches in England and later did the same in Leyden. When they migrated to America they

¹ To appreciate the truth of this latter statement one has only to recall how largely the confessions of the various Protestant bodies are national in character. The Westminster Confession is perhaps the classical illustration of this fact and in the older form of this confession is the direct affirmation that it is the business of the civil power to protect the churches from heretics.

went as "a body in a Covenant of the Lord" in accordance with which they were "strictly tied to all care of each other's good and of the whole by everyone and so mutual."¹ Of this practice and habit was born the celebrated Mayflower Compact of 1620 which is "nothing more nor less than a church covenant turned to civil uses."²

The second of the two fundamental natural rights upon which Locke bases government, viz., the right of the injured person to demand reparation in addition to punishment for injuries, differs from the feudal practice in that the satisfaction is not to honor but for actual damage. This conception may fairly well be said to mark the transition between the feudal and the new covenant notion of basal government ideas. The citizen now has rights as over against "honor."

¹ Cf. Bradford, *History of Plymouth Plantations*, Davis' ed., 1908, pp. 31, 50-55.

² Lois Kimball Matthews, "The Mayflower Compact and Its Descendants," *Miss. Valley Hist. Assoc.* (1912), pp. 79-106.

CHAPTER VI

THE BOURGEOIS SOCIAL MIND

The sixth social mind was to some extent the outgrowth of the municipal development which dates from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but more directly of the impulse given commerce by the rise of trading cities. As the towns became centers of wealth and of influence, the middle class or the bourgeoisie grew in power. This development was particularly marked from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century and culminated in the eighteenth century in the effort of the bourgeoisie throughout the world to put an end to the anachronistic privileges of feudalism and to get its share in the political rights and privileges from which it was debarred. Wherever one looks in the last quarter of the eighteenth century one finds this determined effort on the part of the bourgeois class. In America the movement led to the break with England over the right to self-taxation; in England it appears in the rise of the Whig party as over against the old landowning class; in Germany there were several movements among the townspeople looking to an increase of their rights as over against the nobility; but the most marked illustration of the revolt of the bourgeois class in order to obtain a larger share of political control was to be seen in France. The French Revolution was essentially a bourgeois movement which for a short time dropped into the hands of the proletarians when the bourgeoisie showed itself characteristically incapable of desperate sacrifice.

The triumph of this great middle class in whose hand was the commerce of the world is identified with the rise of capitalism and the so-called industrial revolution. Then as never the world came under the spell of the "Will to Get."

The causes of this extraordinary development were many—the reworking of the gold and silver mines of Europe and the discovery of America with the great increase in Europe's stock of the precious metals, the rise of colonizing syndicates, the increase of the class

of merchants in the now all but independent cities of Italy, Germany, France, and England, trade gilds, new inventions seeking to satisfy the unaccustomed wants, and the new attitude toward life born of the Reformation.

How far Calvinism is to be credited with the new economic spirit will probably always be a matter of dispute. That it is the cause of the capitalistic "system" can hardly be shown, but that the new spirit of freedom and seriousness which emanated from the Genevan capital tended to emphasize thrift as well as labor is not to be denied. Interest ceased to be identified with usury and with the break from the older restrictions became honorable. The great trading and colonization companies furnished new opportunities for investment in the modern sense of the word, and Puritanism, though opposed vehemently to Mammon, regarded saving as a virtue. Thus a new spirit came into Western Europe, and the Calvinist unconsciously became the successor of the Jew as the lender of money. Its emphasis is on the worth of labor involved making thrift a virtue, and thrift is one ancestor of modern capitalism.

But it would probably be a mistake to seek the origin of capitalism wholly in these new conditions. It appears rather to have developed in the succession of economic groups in Venice, Genoa, Florence, Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, which began even in the eleventh and twelfth centuries the accumulation of wealth sufficient to engage in wholesale commerce and to loan considerable sums to nobles and kings.¹ At all events the capitalistic significance of Calvinism can easily be overstated, although its share in the development of the new bourgeois spirit is probable. The beginnings of the drift toward the modern capitalistic system may fairly be placed when lending upon interest was no longer regarded as contrary to good traditions and the Bible. In England this change from the older views of the Middle Ages may be seen in the legislation of Elizabeth and Edward VI. It is true that the Puritan clergy of England opposed the innovation vigorously, but the inevitable march of commerce was toward capitalism. Only

¹ See Henri Pirenne, "Stages in the Social History of Capitalism," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XIX, 494-515. To the contrary see Sombart, *Das moderne Capitalismus*.

through the lending of money could the great enterprises evoked by the discovery of America have been possible. Calvin, though hesitatingly, placed himself on the side of the new economic tendency and favored the taking of interest.¹

Other Calvinist theologians, both French and English, favored the taking of interest, doubtless in some manner because of their hostility to the prohibitions of the Roman Catholic laws. The difference between interest and usury as "excessive interest" had come to be recognized by Catholic² as well as Calvinist writers,³ and another of the foundations of modern capitalism was thus firmly laid.

Men speak disrespectfully of this great middle-class movement in proportion as they sympathize with socialism or with the literary cult which laughs at mid-Victorian propriety. As a matter of fact these years were not unmarked by sordid selfishness. It was the bourgeois rule that forced opium upon China; that in America and England justified slavery; that kept Germany from moving into an imperial unity; and built up in France the fiasco of the Second Empire.

The spirit of the bourgeois class is essentially the spirit of getting something through good bargains. It is not marked by a sensi-

¹ On this entire matter see Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, II, 74-87.

² The Fourth Council of the Lateran (1215) permits men to receive interest if it be not excessive—a distinction that has ever since become universally valid.

³ In this connection it should not be forgotten that the great merchants and bankers of Italy and Southern Germany were Roman Catholic and that the development of bourgeois prosperity in England was due in no small degree to the migration thither after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes of those thousands of Huguenots who might otherwise have built up a similar Protestant class of artisans and small capitalists in France.

For the most vigorous exposition of the relation of Calvinism to capitalism see Weber, "Protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, XX, XXI, XXX; cf. Troeltsch, *Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, I, 607-794. For the economic influence of English Puritanism, see Cunningham, *The Moral Witness of the Church on the Investment of Money and the Use of Wealth*. The literature on the development of capitalism after the middle of the eighteenth century is of course enormous. A good summary of the various theories as to the nature and origin of capital will be found in Böhm-Bawerk, *Capital and Interest*.

tiveness as to honor. To it chivalry resembles the experiences of Don Quixote.

Theologically this social mind showed little or no progress. It felt profoundly the individual's need of heaven, in much the same sense that the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century felt that need. It was essentially eschatological in its conception of salvation, and viewed with no small uneasiness such men as Maurice and the Christian socialists who were not ready to make of the gospel a message of mere "other-worldliness." It was natural, therefore, for this commercially minded self-centered community to find satisfaction for its religious needs in the extension of commercial principles to religion.¹

How far this sense of need was that of a deliverance from hell can be inferred from the popularity of such a poem as Wigglesworth's "Day of Doom." The imagery of Edwards' famous sermon, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," pales before that of this extraordinary production.

The evangelical theology of the nineteenth century centered about the substitutionary atonement of Christ conceived of commercially. Its favorite hymns were those dealing with the fact that "Jesus paid it all" and that "Heaven is our home." Under the dominance of this commercialism there arose presentations of theology, all desperately in earnest but sometimes all but sordid.²

It is customary for many men nowadays to look back with no small regret to those old days and to lament the fact that it is no longer possible for men to be moved by appeals such as those which were so prominent in the early days of the great revival period from 1870 to 1885, but to reinstate such theology as a genuine religious dynamic would demand the re-establishment of the bourgeois indifference to the need of evangelizing social forces, however vigorously the vices of the day might be assailed.³

¹ For a commentary on this statement one needs only to read the life of Wilberforce and the account of the early career of the Earl of Shaftsbury. Recall also the attitude of many earnest Christians in America to the abolition of slavery.

² For a collection of quotations from the theological (especially the eschatological) thought of this period see Farrar, *Mercy and Judgment* and *Eternal Hope*.

³ Instances of the indifference of English Nonconformists to great social wrongs involving financial prestige can be found in Shaftsbury's *Life*.

The middle of the eighteenth century was marked by a wave of revivalism that concentrated the attention of America and England upon the fear of the monarch God and upon the need of deliverance by God from his own anger. Jonathan Edwards and Whitefield are the two best-known representatives of this movement, but, as in the case of similar movements, they had a host of less balanced and consequently fanatical imitators. To them culture was dangerously near infidelity and vituperation became a common feature in sermons.¹

Candor must further compel us to admit that however much we may desire to reinvest our age with a sense of the eternal values of men and women, it would be a distinct retrogression to re-establish precisely the doctrinal positions which this bourgeois movement enforced; for the very men who were most loyal to the commercialized atonement were the men who were indifferent to the needs of tenants and employees, the dangers of industrialized childhood and womanhood.

Yet it must be borne in mind that it was from this evangelicalism that social virtues emerged. The deep-seated belief in a self-sacrificing God inevitably tended to find expression in the spirit of social service. The Nonconformist conscience can no longer be charged with indifference to social needs, but long before it had been aroused to the need of checking poverty, reforming prison administration, freeing slaves, providing hospitals for the insane, and model tenements for the poor, it had set an example of devotion to the sanctity of marriage and had developed very distinct conceptions as to individual honesty. From it has sprung also the noble charity that so characterizes modern life as well as gifts to foreign missions. Yet, it must be added, its charities and its achievement of universal suffrage for a generation left it

¹ One of these extremists, James Davenport, is reported to have prayed, "Good Lord, I will not mince matters with Thee; Thou knowest and I know that most of the ministers of Boston and of the country are unconverted and are leading their people blindfold to hell." See Tracy, *The Great Awakening*, p. 247; Chauncy (a contemporary), *Seasonable Thoughts*. Whitefield attacked Yale and Harvard, but subsequently apologized. See Hayes, "Study of the Edwardean Revival," *Am. Jour. Psychology*, XIII; Davenport, *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, chap. viii, gives other references.

unwilling to democratize privilege in the industrial world and insistent upon the maintenance of the economic *status quo*. As a consequence its conception of salvation is that of individual rescue from the world, rather than of the transformation of character through the individual's participation in God's activity conditioned by a thoroughgoing extension of Christ's principle of love to social structures. That this attitude is changing is due to the rise of a new interest in the teaching of Jesus and the pervasive influence of the new and modern spirit of democracy.

Two other expressions of this new bourgeois mind need only to be mentioned. One is Unitarianism, which emphasized particularly the rights of humanity. Humanity, it insisted, was something more than a mass of corruption. It could not be treated by God as altogether without rights. Just as the French people had stood up against the demands of an autocratic sovereign, so did the representative of this new religious movement stand up against the hyper-Calvinistic conception of God. Unitarianism moved over into other fields of theology and to a considerable extent re-expressed the counter-social mind which Socinianism had presented in the preceding century. But its fundamental influence upon religious development has been largely in the field where it most clearly expressed this new creative social mind of the eighteenth century. While Unitarianism for a variety of reasons has never been accepted by the church as a whole, it has had undoubtedly influence in forcing representatives of orthodox evangelicism to recognize more clearly the inherent worth of humanity which, although it needs to be saved, is not as desperately doomed as hyper-Calvinism would represent.

The other movement was less in the field of theology than in that of general church structure and spirit. This movement, commonly called Wesleyanism and Methodism, is obviously an aspect of the growing spirit of democracy within the social mind of the eighteenth century. It may therefore be practically regarded as one side of the healthy transition from the bourgeois movement of the eighteenth century to the democratic movement of the later nineteenth.

CHAPTER VII

THE MODERN SOCIAL MIND

The seventh social mind is that of our modern days and may be called scientific-democratic. True, our modern world is marked by capitalism, but capitalism has ceased to represent creative forces and has no distinctive theology. As a system it has frankly undertaken the worship of Mammon and it is by no means ashamed. This is not to deny that many individual capitalists are professedly and, as I believe, sincerely religious. It is simply to call attention to the historical fact that the religious interests of capitalism are in the very nature of the case allied with those of imperialism and supramundane salvation. Capitalism is inevitably non-social in its sympathies and its highest altruism is in the field of education and amelioration. As capitalism aspires to the control of material good it has little enough opportunity to think of religion except as a means of future salvation in heaven. It naturally favors impressing men with the need of submission to God. It no more can invent a theology than the feudal knight or the Roman Empire could invent a theology. It is rather content to preserve the theology born of imperialism and feudalism. Theologically its representatives are generally reactionary and naturally insistent upon maintaining the dogmas created by the Hellenistic mind in an age when religion was estopped from social reconstruction. It feels safer when preachers use old concepts and terms. It easily thinks of God as a king or as a sovereign Lord, but even the capitalist cannot think of God as a trust magnate.¹

On the other hand, our democracy, which is the inevitable counter-movement to capitalism, is a creative conception from which emanate religious as well as political influences. These influences, however, are only beginning to express themselves in the religious

¹ From certain points of view Christian Science appears a partial expression of the social mind expressed in capitalism, but it is hardly possible to make general statements at this point.

world, largely because the religious world is institutionalized in churches, which in the nature of the case are conservative whenever questions of inherited privileges are at stake. The reason for this is not difficult to discover. Roman Catholicism is anti-democratic in its very genius and Protestantism has been essentially a bourgeois movement, as a rule composed of those who share in the economic surplus.

Capitalism and democracy are the two poles of that great social evolution which began about the time that the imperialistic idea of Christianity was finally overthrown with Napoleon, and the bourgeois and national conceptions finally became dominant. The roots of the new development of the nineteenth century extended of course far back into the preceding century, but the capitalistic movement, in its present phase at least, began when the corporation, an impersonal person, replaced the manufacturer, a personal person. The results are too obvious to need description, but they may all be summed up in the formula that in the economic world persons with political rights and legal freedom were treated impersonally.

As one looks across the centuries it is evident that this is a condition which is new. The master treated the slave impersonally, but regarded him as such; the lord treated the serf impersonally, but gave him certain personal rights and felt some measure of responsibility for his welfare; the private manufacturer treated his employees as "hands," but built up, particularly in the smaller industries, friendly relations of a semi-feudal sort. But the corporation, particularly in America, where the claim of individuals to personal rights has been purchased at enormous cost, re-established the impersonal relationship in the economic world without even the recognition of the old feudal obligation of protection.

The result has been inevitable and prompt. The machine-working class is organizing against the machine-owning class. The latter is now on the defensive. Between the two there survives the old bourgeois social mind, but the interests of the middle class are increasingly being identified either with the corporation or with the wage-earner. Thus the new democratic spirit is primarily interested in economics, just as the democratic movement

of the eighteenth century was essentially political and concerned with the welfare of the bourgeois group. At that time the wage-earning classes had not been sufficiently consolidated in their struggle with the employing classes to make concerted action possible. But now the situation is radically different. The democratic social mind is rapidly becoming class-conscious, and is being trained by the socialists into class hatred.¹

Fortunately, however, this is not the only form of expression that the democratic movement is taking. The significant thing is that the bourgeois class itself is rapidly being leavened by democratic ideals of social service. While this new and hopeful attitude of those possessed of economic and political privileges does not meet the approval of radical democrats, it must be counted as a hopeful tendency in modern life.

This new democratic social mind with its passion for justice needs a theology. For our survey of the influence of the social mind upon religion has led us quite astray if it has not shown that needs are always the mother of theology. Christianity has its true genius and breeds true to itself, but as a developing religion has set forth its generic teachings and its institutions in accordance with the new needs which a social evolution has made universal. Counter-social minds have, it is true, organized themselves, but they have been able to develop lasting theologies and institutions only as they have later become a part of the dominant and creative social mind of a new period. The democratic social mind has its religious needs which can be satisfied only with an interpretation of the gospel. It is hardly to be expected that today any more than in the past this process of reapplication and exposition of a religious inheritance to new needs will be without effect. Men of tomorrow and men of yesterday always combat one another.

But how could it be otherwise? How can the modern democratic mind feel its needs satisfied by the formulas born in an age of feudalism and imperialism? Capitalism would undoubtedly find itself more in sympathy with these formulas, for they would

¹ It might be added that the more recent socialist thought seems to be somewhat afraid of the Frankenstein of class hatred it has created. See Walling, *Larger Aspects of Socialism*.

minister better to its religious needs. But democracy is not committed to capitalism in any such way as to make it certain that what would satisfy the religious needs born of a sense of possession of wealth would be satisfied by the gospel expressed in formulas born of a search to socialize economic privilege. The democratic mind attempts to apply to every moral issue its tests of justice-giving, service, and social solidarity. How can the philosophy of Aristotle reappearing in the theology of Thomas Aquinas endure such a test? Frankly, it cannot. The Roman Catholic church in its maintenance of imperialism in church and theology is characteristically consistent when it urges priests and teachers of the twentieth century to return to the study of that great representative of an imperialistic church and of imperialistic theology.

On the other hand, how can the inherited conventional evangelicism of the bourgeois class, with its tacit acceptance of economic inequalities, its centering of attention upon salvation after death, its commercial doctrine of the atonement, and its hostility to what it terms the social gospel, endure? It, too, cannot endure as a theology unless it adapts itself to new conditions in response to the creative needs and influence of democracy. That it will make such adjustment is altogether probable. In fact the process is already under way. It is the glory of Protestantism that despite its constant tendency to become a religion of authority it also recognizes that, eternal as is the gospel, Christian theology is not static, but is developing.

The task which our religion therefore faces at present is nothing new. It is that which each creative age has faced. It differs only as its elements differ. The social mind itself is not yet fully complete, and the needs born of democratic evolution are complicated by those which are due to the rise of a scientific method. But both movements alike are being approached by our religious thinking and both alike are already so adjusting our Christian inheritance as to make it ever more dynamic in our changing order.

The task of modern theology is very similar to that of the pre-Nicene period, yet it is really more difficult than that of the early theologies. For whereas ante-Nicene Fathers like Clement of

Alexandria in thinking of God had no difficulty in using the Semitic conception of sovereignty, our modern scientific and democratic world cannot use such conceptions so far as they represent impossible cosmology on the one side and autocratic monarchy on the other.

Yet our present situation is full of hope. At least we have delimited our problem and have discovered a method. Our survey of the creative social minds of the modern period has brought us face to face with the function of Christian doctrine, namely, to meet the religious needs of an age by such an adjustment and development of generic Christianity as will enable that age to realize its possibilities. So stupendous a task is altogether too great for any single man. Our hope lies in the fact that the social mind which has given rise to religious needs has always furnished from its own experience those conceptions which bring evangelic truths into immediate and helpful satisfaction of such needs. Thus the Hellenistic world, which needed to be sure that salvation mediated through Jesus Christ was from God, found its satisfaction in the Logos and essence theologies. The world of the Middle Ages, suffering from the pessimism born of a disorganized society, needed the unifying and steady message of a sovereign God whose honor and whose power were not at the disposal of barbarian, baron, or king. This need was satisfied as Christianity embodied the ideas of empire and feudalism. The needs of the Reformation period, with its disintegrating factors and its development of nationalities, with its break with imperial unity and scholastic universals, were met as the new epoch mediated to itself the work of Christ through the formulas of the newly arising monarchy. The bourgeoisie which fought for privileges kept from it by monarch and clergy and nobility found its spiritual needs satisfied in thinking of God's free grace and redemption as limited to no class and brought home to men the conception of a sacrificing God who cares very little about orthodoxy and very much about people.

Similarly, in our modern world we shall find that Christianity furnishes satisfaction for the universal need of a religion that shall not only save individuals but society in accordance with the laws of the universe. Our task is indeed great, but the history of

the evolution of Christianity gives us courage. In the process of readjustment neither the radical nor the ultra-conservative will prevail, but out from the storm and stress of the period will come, not a new religion, but a Christianity broadened by the application of the gospel of and about Jesus to the needs of our modern world.

Theologies may change, but the realities which they have expressed will endure, enriched and reinforced by what the Spirit of God teaches the spirit of the age.